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This paper aims to examine three issues: how bad the productivity performance in Japan’s 
service sector has been; why it is important to accelerate TFP growth in the service sector; 
and why TFP has stagnated in Japan’s service sector. The main findings of the paper are as 
follows. First, TFP growth in the manufacturing sector is much higher than that in other 
sectors, although the manufacturing sector’s share is declining rapidly. For Japan, whose 
population is in decline, productivity growth in the service sector is key for economic 
growth. Second, TFP growth in ICT-using sectors declined substantially after 1995. Third, 
accumulation of ICT assets in Japan was very slow in comparison with other developed 
countries. Forth, the low level of intangible investment is probably one important cause of 
the stagnation of TFP; another is that Japan’s service sector has fallen behind with regard to 
investment in ICT. Fifth, it seems that Japan’s low metabolism also impedes productivity 
growth. Sixth, firms invest little in on-the-job training and off-the-job training for part-time 
workers, and the increase in part-time workers may have slowed down human-capital 
accumulation. Seventh, it appears that Japanese firms have fallen behind in terms of 
internationalization and economies of scale. 
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1. Introduction 
As in other advanced countries, the share of the service sector in the economy has 
been steadily increasing in Japan. This means that productivity growth in this sector 
provides the key for Japan’s future economic growth. Yet, looking at actual trends 
shows that productivity in this sector has stagnated for a long period. Against this 
background, the purpose of this paper is to examine why this is the case, reviewing 
previous studies on the issue and using industry level data of factor inputs and 
productivity.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section looks at the productivity 
performance of Japan’s service sector and compares it with other major countries. It also 
discusses why service sector productivity is important for Japan’s future growth. 
Section 3 then examines why productivity in Japan’s service sector has stagnated for 
such a long period, analyzing issues such as investment in information and 
communication technology (ICT), intangible investment, the natural selection 
mechanism in the service sector, how the recent increase in part-time workers will affect 
productivity, and average firm size in the service sector. Finally, Section 4 summarizes 
the major findings of the paper.   
 
 
2. Why is the Service Sector Important for Japan’s Future Growth? 
From a supply-side perspective, there are three engines for economic growth: 
increases in labor input, capital accumulation, and increases in total factor productivity 
(TFP).  
Let us look at the trends in each of these components for Japan, starting with labor 
input. Japan’s working age population, defined as those aged 15 to 64, grew rapidly 
during the 1950s and 1960s. However, once the baby boomer generation had come of 
age, the growth in the working age population declined rapidly. Specifically, while the 
working age population grew by an average of 1.7% annually between 1955 and 1973 
and still increased at a rate of 0.7% between 1973 and 1995, it has actually been 
shrinking since then at an average annual rate of 0.3%.   
Next, let us consider the role of capital deepening. This, in fact, accounted for much 
of Japan’s rapid economic growth during the 1950s to early 1970s. However, as is well 
known, the marginal productivity of capital and the rate of return to capital tend to 
decline over time as capital deepening continues, so that countries cannot maintain rapid 
growth based on capital deepening forever. In fact, Japan’s rate of return to capital fell 




2 Especially in the case of the manufacturing sector, capital 
formation became so small that the net real capital stock recorded a decline between 
2000 and 2002. These trends with regard to labor input and capital accumulation mean 
that productivity growth is the key for Japan’s future economic growth. 
Historically, labor productivity in Japan’s tertiary sector was not much lower than 
in the secondary sector except during the period of rapid industrialization from 
1947-1965. Figure 1 compares labor productivity (either nominal value added per 
man-hour or nominal value added per worker) across sectors. The values are normalized 




Data for periods between 1947-65 are from Table 2.12 on page 41 of Ohkawa and Shinohara, eds., (1979).
Subsidiary occupations are taken account of for periods before the Second World War.
Data before 1965 are on a per worker basis. Data from 1973 are on a man-hour basis.
Data for periods after 1970 are from the JIP Database 2009.
The primary sector consists of agriculture, fishery, and forestry. The secondary sector consists of mining, manufacturing and
construction. The tertiary sector consists of all other sectors except imputed rent.














                                                  
2 It is worth noting here that, among the OCED countries, only Japan and Korea experienced very 
rapid capital deepening and a swift decline in the rate of return to capital. See Pyo and Nam (1999).  
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However, if we compare labor and total factor productivity growth in Japan’s 
tertiary sector with that in the manufacturing sector, there is a huge difference. As 
Figure 2 shows, TFP in Japan’s non-manufacturing sector (market economy
3) grew by 
only 23% in 1970-2006 (for an annual growth rate of 0.57%). On the other hand, TFP in 




Source: JIP Database 2009.
Figure 2. TFP growth in manufacturing and non-manufacturing









































































































economy, excluding house rent)
 
 
                                                  
3 The term “market economy” here means that education, medical services, government activities, 
and imputed house rent are excluded.     
4 In the 1990s and early 2000s, TFP growth in the manufacturing sector also stagnated. The sharp 
decline in TFP growth in the manufacturing sector can be partly explained by the idling of capital 
stock, which was caused by the recession in this period. However, even taking account of the decline 
in the capacity utilization rate of capital, we obtain a similarly rapid declining trend in TFP growth in 
the manufacturing sector.  
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Despite the low productivity growth in the non-manufacturing sector (Figure 2), the 
level of labor productivity relative to the manufacturing sector, as seen in Figure 1, did 
not decline drastically, because of the sharp increase in the relative price of 
non-manufacturing output vis-à-vis manufacturing output.   
As in other developed economies, the share of the manufacturing sector in Japan’s 
economy overall is declining rapidly. As Figure 3 shows, the manufacturing sector 
accounted only for 22% of Japan’s nominal GDP in 2002, while its share in terms of 
employment was only 19%.   
 
Sources: JIP 2006 and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 2005.
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Figure 3 also shows that de-industrialization in Japan accelerated twice during the 
period since 1970: after the first oil shock in the early 1970s, and then in the early 1990s 
following the burst of the “bubble economy.” The second acceleration in 
de-industrialization seems to have been caused by a decline in the domestic demand for 
investment goods and by the relocation of production through foreign direct investment. 
In the 1990s, Japanese firms shifted production to other Asian countries (primarily the 
ASEAN countries and China) in order to lower wage and other production costs. In the 
case of the electrical machinery industry especially there was a sharp increase in 
overseas production and a decline in domestic production and net exports in the period 
1990-2003.  
Since it is mainly large productive firms that invested abroad, this relocation of 
production may well have led to the closure of productive establishments in Japan: only 
44% of all the establishments which existed in 1990 survived until 2003 and not many 
new establishments were opened during this period. As a result, the number of 
establishments declined by 33%. It is important to note that even among establishments 
with the highest level of labor productivity in their respective industry, the survival rate 
was not much higher: only 47% of establishments ranked in the top three deciles in each 
of the 50 manufacturing sectors in 1990 survived until 2003.
5 
Judging from the fact that de-industrialization has proceeded even further in the 
United States than in Japan (Figure 3), it seems likely that Japan’s manufacturing sector 
will continue to shrink in the future. And with de-industrialization set to continue and 
the total labor force shrinking, acceleration in service sector productivity growth is 
becoming all the more important for Japan’s future economic growth.   
Comparing Japan’s productivity performance with that of other countries, we find 
that there is certainly a lot of room for improvement, both in manufacturing and in 
services. Figure 4 shows sectoral TFP growth in the market economy for major 
developed countries for 1980-1995 and 1995-2005. Japan experienced relatively high 
TFP growth in the information and communication technology (ICT)-producing sector 
(electrical machinery, post and communication). However, the problem for Japan is that 
TFP growth in ICT-using sectors, such as distribution services (retail, wholesale and 
transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical 
machinery), declined substantially after 1995. And these ICT-using sectors have larger 
shares in the economy than the ICT-producing sector. The average share of labor input 
(hours worked) in the ICT-producing sector in Japan’s total labor input in 1995-2005 
was 4.7%, while the labor input shares of distribution services and the rest of the 
                                                  
5  See Fukao, Kim and Kwon (2008).  
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manufacturing sector were 23.4% and 16.8%, respectively. 
This pattern differs substantially from that observed for the United States, which 
experienced an acceleration in TFP growth not only in ICT-producing sectors but also in 
ICT-using sectors. On the other hand, South Korea and most of the European countries 
did not experience an acceleration of TFP growth in ICT-using sectors. In other words, 
the ICT revolution in ICT-using sectors occurred only in the United States.   
 
Other goods producing industries
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008.



































































































































































































































































Personal and social services
 
 
Next, Figure 5 compares sectoral labor productivity in Japan and the EU 15 
countries (excluding Greece) relative to that of the United States. The figure also 
provides a comparison for four factors that underlie differences in labor productivity, 
that is, differences in the quality of labor, differences in ICT capital service input per 
man-hour, differences in non-ICT capital service input per man-hour, and differences in 
the TFP level.   
The figure shows that the labor productivity gap between Japan and the United 
States is larger in the non-manufacturing sector than in the manufacturing sector. Labor  
6 
 
productivity levels in Japan’s non-manufacturing sectors are generally less than 50 
percent of the US levels. In the case of non-ICT capital service input per man-hour, 
Japan uses much more such input than the United States. With regard to labor quality, 
there is not much difference between the two countries. The differences in labor 
productivity are mainly caused by Japan’s low level of ICT-capital service input and low 
TFP.
6 
Japan                 EU 15 (excluding Greece)
Figure 5. PPP adjusted labor productivity, factor inputs, and TFP: Japan, EU and US comparison (2005, US=1)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since ICT investment may contribute to innovation in production processes, the 
difference in ICT-capital service input between Japan and the other countries is likely 
one of the major causes of the stagnation of TFP in Japan.   
We should note that it is very difficult to compare differences in the quality of 
services across countries and to measure PPP for services. For example, the quantity of 
                                                  
6  In the case of finance and business services and personal services, ITC capital service 
input per man-hour is not lower than in the United States. The differences in labor 
productivity are caused by Japan’s low level of TFP.  
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truck transportation is basically measured as a unit of tonnage multiplied by kilometers 
per man-hour (how much transportation in tonnage and distance was conducted by one 
man-hour) and differences in quality, such as just-in-time delivery, are not taken account. 
Similarly, in retail services, the length of business hours is not taken into account.  
Measured productivity of German shops might be higher than that of Japanese shops 




3. Why Has TFP in Japan’s Service Sector Stagnated? 
This section examines why TFP in Japan’s service sector has stagnated. According 
to the analysis in the previous section, one “prime suspect” is the slower accumulation 
of ICT capital in Japan, and this section looks at this issue in greater detail. However, 
additional factors, which may have contributed to the stagnation of productivity in 
Japan’s service sector, such as slow accumulation of intangible capital, an insufficient 
natural selection mechanism, are also considered.   
Starting with the issue of ICT investment, Figure 6 compares the ratio of ICT 
investment to GDP across the major developed countries. The figure shows that 
accumulation of ICT capital was very slow in Japan. It seems that Japan did not 
experience an ICT revolution in ICT-using sectors simply because it did not undertake 

























Why was Japan left behind in ICT investment? There are likely a number of 
reasons. One possibly is that the ratio of custom software investment to packaged 
software investment is much larger in Japan than in the United States. When Japanese 
firms introduce ICT, such as an ICT system for customer services or the management of 
information flows within the firm, they prefer custom software in order to avoid 
business reorganization and the training of workers. This results in a smaller 
productivity improvement from ICT investment. This example suggests that it is 
important to compare intangible investment in Japan with that in other developed 
economies. 
As Figure 7 shows, the investment/value added ratio in Japan has been much lower 
than that in the United States. However, in this context it is interesting to note that 
contrary to the case of intangible investment, Japan’s tangible investment/value added 




Figure 7. Intangible and tangible investment over value added ratio: Japan-US comparison
Sources: Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda, and Tonogi (2009). Original data for the US are taken from Corrado,











































































































































































































































Next, Figure 8 compares the composition of intangible investment in Japan, the 
United States, and Britain. The figure suggests that, compared with the other two 
countries, Japan invests a lot in R&D, most of which is conducted in the manufacturing 
sector, but very little in economic competencies such as brand equity, firm-specific 




Sources: Japan: Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda and Tonogi


















Figure 8. Intangible investment 













Table 1, which is based on Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda and Tonogi (2009), 
compares intangible investment by category in the manufacturing sector with that in the 
service sector.
7 During the period of 2000-2005, intangible investment/value added 
ratio in the service sector was 9.5 percent, about one half of the corresponding ratio, 
17.3 percent, in the manufacturing sector. This large gap is mainly caused by the fact 
that most R&D investment in Japan is conducted by the manufacturing sector. Figure 9 
shows the results of growth accounting with intangible capital by sector.
8 We can see 
                                                  
7  In Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda and Tonogi (2008, 2009), the service sector is defined as the 
whole economy minus manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, construction, and the 
public sector. 
8 We should note that, in this growth accounting, accumulation of human capital, except 
firm-specific human capital, is not taken account of.    
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that the contribution of intangible investment to labor productivity growth in the service 
sector is on a declining trend and has been much smaller than that in the manufacturing 
sector. The low level of intangible investment is one important cause of the stagnation 
of labor productivity in Japan’s service sector.   
Unfortunately, there are no estimates of intangible investment by sector for other 
countries that are compatible with the estimates in Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda 
and Tonogi (2008, 2009).
9 Therefore, it is premature to conclude that productivity 
growth and ICT investment in Japan’s service sector lag behind those in other countries 
because of Japan’s low level of intangible investment. 
 
                                                  
9  However, one such project is currently in progress at the Productivity Commission of the 
Australian Government.  
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Computerized information 2,447 (2.09) 6,125 (2.37)
 Custom software 1,526 (1.30) 4,197 (1.61)
 Packaged software 184 (0.16) 388 (0.15)
 In-house software 510 (0.45) 1,065 (0.42)
 Databases 226 (0.19) 475 (0.18)
Innovative property 13,316 (11.22) 9,161 (3.55)
 Science and engineering R&D 9,312 (7.83) 1,052 (0.40)
 Mineral exploitation 0 (0.00) 16 (0.01)
 Copyright and license costs 472 (0.41) 4,152 (1.61)
 Other product development, design,
and research expenses
3,531 (2.98) 3,940 (1.54)
Economic competencies 4,657 (3.95) 9,292 (3.59)
 Brand equity 1,876 (1.59) 3,477 (1.33)
 Firm-specific human capital 584 (0.49) 1,334 (0.54)
 Organizational structure 2,198 (0.91) 4,480 (0.36)
Total 20,420 (17.27) 24,577 (9.51)
Intangible investment/Tangible
investment 0.9 0.5




Source: Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda, and Tonogi (2008).









































Another possible reason for the stagnation of TFP in Japan’s service sector is that 
the natural selection mechanism is not working properly. An indication of this is 
provided in Figure 10, which shows that start-up and closure rates of establishments in 
Japan are much lower than those in the United States. Further evidence is provided in 
the study by Kim, Kwon and Fukao (2007), which, using firm level data for Japan’s 
service sector, decomposes productivity dynamics in the periods 1997-1999 and 
2000-2002. Following Griliches and Regev (1995), the study decomposed changes in 
the average labor productivity in a particular industry into the following four effects: the 
within effect, the reallocation effect, the entry effect, and the exit effect.   
The results of that analysis are shown in Table 2. They indicate that in several 
non-manufacturing sectors, such as construction and transportation, large negative 
reallocation effects and exit effects on industry-level labor productivity growth can be 
observed. In many industries, such as, business services, personal services, 
advertisement, and information services, net entry effects (entry effects plus exit effects) 
took positive values, but they were more than offset by the large negative values of 
reallocation effects. Thus, it seems that Japan’s low metabolism also impedes 




Figure 10. Start-up and closure rate of establishments: Japan-US comparison
Note: Data are based on statistics from the employment insurance program of each country. 
Sources: Small Business Administration, US Government (1998), Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Ministry
of Industry, Trade and Industry, Japanese Government (2001), and Study Group on “Industry Hollowing-out”


























































































Figure 4.1.Panel A. Start-up rate: 


























































































Figure 4.2.Panel B. Closure rate: 






















Entry effect Exit effect
a=b+c+d b c d=e+f e f
Construction -4.80% 0.07% -5.03% 0.16% 1.48% -1.32%
Wholesale 4.05% 1.59% 0.83% 1.63% 1.33% 0.30%
Retail 4.74% 2.53% 1.02% 1.19% 0.95% 0.24%
Real estate 1.78% 1.85% -0.37% 0.30% -0.66% 0.95%
Transportation -4.84% 0.61% -3.91% -1.53% -1.80% 0.27%
Warehousing and other transportation related service -3.48% 0.72% -4.37% 0.17% -1.34% 1.50%
Communication 36.83% 8.60% 25.56% 2.67% 1.11% 1.56%
Electricity -1.11% 6.88% -8.06% 0.07% 0.03% 0.04%
Gas, water and heat supply -3.93% 0.56% -5.35% 0.86% 0.98% -0.13%
Hotels -0.23% 1.75% -1.03% -0.95% -2.08% 1.13%
Broadcasting -10.19% 0.22% -15.38% 4.96% 4.85% 0.11%
Personal services 0.19% 0.36% -1.74% 1.58% -0.13% 1.70%
Business services -0.32% 1.83% -2.78% 0.63% -1.54% 2.17%
Information services -2.62% -0.64% -3.70% 1.72% 0.49% 1.22%
Eating and drinking places 0.77% 0.49% -1.15% 1.44% -2.33% 1.74%
Other services -0.30% 0.12% 0.17% -0.59% 0.99% 0.45%
Advertisement -6.21% -2.64% -9.85% 6.29% 9.81% -3.52%
Amusement 3.69% 3.40% -0.26% 0.56% -1.73% 2.28%
Medical and care services and hygiene 0.23% 0.94% -0.06% -0.65% -2.54% 1.89%
Source: Kim, Kwon and Fukao (2007).
Figure 2. Decomposition of changes in labor productivity in non-manufacturing sectors: Average value
of results for 1997－99 and results for 2000-02, annual values, %
 
 
Another important factor which may be having a negative effect on TFP growth in 
Japan’s service sector is the rapid increase in part-time workers in the 1990s. As Figure 
11 shows, the share of part-time workers in total workers increased sharply in some  
15 
 
service sectors, such as retail, finance, telecommunication, and information services. 
Moreover, the increases in these service sectors are larger than those in manufacturing 
sectors, such as computers and related devices, communication equipment, and 
automobiles. Although the share of part-time workers declined in many sectors during 
the economic expansion of the 2000s, it still remains at a high level. 
This increase in part-time workers will slow down human-capital accumulation, as 
firms invest little in on-the-job and off-the-job training for part-time workers (Fukao, 
Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda and Tonogi, 2009; Ikenaga and Kawaguchi, 2010). 
According to Kim, Fukao and Makino (2010), the increase of part-time workers from 
1990 to 2000 reduced Japan’s human capital by 2.0 percent.
10 
As shown in Fukao et al. (2006), the productivity gap between part-time workers 
and regular workers is larger than the wage gap between them, suggesting that firms pay 
a premium to part-time workers in order to obtain flexibility of employment. Thus, the 
increase in part-time workers poses a problem not only in term of equity but also in 
terms of productivity. 
 
                                                  
10 During this period, many elder employees, who were less educated on average than younger 
employees, have retired. Moreover, the share of the self-employed, whose average labor income is 
smaller than that of other workers, has declined. These factors contributed to the growth of human 
capital in Japan. In total, the growth rate of human capital in Japan was not lower than that in the 
United States.  
16 
 
Source: JIP Database 2009.

















































































































A final issue to be pointed out here that may contribute to Japan’s disappointing 
productivity performance is that Japanese firms in service sectors tend to be smaller 
than, for example, their US counterparts in the same sector. Table 3 compares the 
number of listed firms and their average size measured in terms of the number of 
workers in the United States and Japan. The data are on a consolidated basis for all 
stock market-listed firms. In the manufacturing sector, the gap between Japan and the 
United States in terms of average firm size is not very large. However, in the case of 
wholesale and retail as well as other services, US firms are much larger than Japanese 
firms on a consolidated basis.  This difference in average firm size implies that 
Japanese firms in these sectors are much less likely to be internationalized and enjoy 

















































2000 909 7,306 1,451 7,145 262 2,554 363 19,620 148 1,866 655 7,183
2001 774 6,611 1,466 6,729 243 1,626 361 20,302 157 1,462 655 7,096
2002 1,079 4,799 1,490 6,501 418 1,093 368 19,857 315 906 691 7,745
2003 1,291 4,546 1,558 6,314 540 1,207 375 21,841 398 855 690 7,418
2004 1,567 4,702 1,575 6,560 630 1,506 390 21,404 496 999 717 7,658
2005 1,622 4,960 1,606 6,376 668 1,597 389 23,175 564 981 715 7,736
2000 17 16,422 96 11,576 234 5,970 763 5,302
2001 13 19,438 102 10,938 214 4,343 827 4,981
2002 23 11,193 108 10,664 307 2,944 848 5,111
2003 32 8,046 121 9,453 367 2,858 894 4,822
2004 44 6,440 122 9,204 466 3,191 963 5,120
2005 50 5,881 123 9,281 493 3,052 967 5,195
Source: Kwon (2010).
Table 3. Number of listed firms and their average size measured by consolidated workers: US-Japan comparison (based on
consolidated financial data of all  listed firms)






This paper aimed to examine three issues: the productivity performance in Japan’s 
service sector; why it is important to accelerate TFP growth in the service sector; and 
why TFP has stagnated in Japan’s service sector. The main findings of the paper are as 
follows. 
 
(1)  TFP growth in the manufacturing sector is much higher than that in the other 
sectors. However, the share of the manufacturing sector is declining rapidly. For 
Japan, which is now experiencing population decline, productivity growth in the 
service sector is key for economic growth. 
(2)  TFP growth in ICT-using sectors declined substantially after 1995. 
(3)  Accumulation of ICT assets in Japan was very slow in comparison with other 
developed countries. 
(4)  The low level of intangible investment is probably one important cause of the 
stagnation of TFP; another is that Japan’s service sector has fallen behind with 
regard to investment in ICT. 
(5)  It seems that Japan’s low metabolism also impedes productivity growth. 
(6)  Firms invest little in on-the-job training and off-the-job training for part-time 
workers. The increase in part-time workers may have slowed down human-capital 
accumulation. 
(7)  It appears that Japanese firms have fallen behind in terms of internationalization 




Unfortunately, these are deep-seated structural issues that cannot be resolved 
overnight. Moreover, they tend to be closely intertwined and overcoming them will 
require both changes in economic policies and corporate practices. For example, if 
Japan’s comparatively low investment in ICT indeed is the result of a reluctance to 
reorganize business structures and retrain workers, this may in turn be linked to the 
increase in part-time workers, which at least in part is a consequence of Japan’s labor 
market structures. Possible government policies to address these issues would include 
the provision of structures and incentives that facilitate and reward investment in ICT 
(and intangible assets) and in the training of part-time workers and mitigate the 
polarization in the labor market between regular workers and part-time workers while at 
the same time providing for greater labor market flexibility.   
 
Similarly, slow growth, the low metabolism of the economy, and the fact that 
Japan’s service sector has fallen behind in terms of internationalization and exploiting 
economies of scale are all interrelated. Many areas of the service sector remain heavily 
regulated, thus preventing competition and greater dynamism through the entry, growth, 
and exit of firms. Obvious policy measures would be to continue with deregulation and, 
for instance, facilitating inward foreign direct investment to encourage the entry of 
firms that already operate internationally and enjoy economies of scale. 
 
To end on a brighter note, although the challenges for Japan’s economy are 
considerable, they are not insurmountable. Moreover, the fact that Japan’s productivity 
in many service sectors lags behind that of, say, the United States also carries the 
promise of catch-up growth in these areas. If Japan’s firms were to invest in ICT and 
intangible assets to a similar extent as their US counterparts and invested in the training 
of those now working part-time, this could provide Japan with productivity growth in 
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